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The Apollo 1 Fire: A Case Study in the
Flammability of Fabrics
Greg DiLisi and Stella McLean, John Carroll University, University Hts., OH

T

his January marked the 52nd anniversary of the Apollo
1 fire. On Jan. 27, 1967, the interior of NASA’s AS-204
command module (CM), occupied by American astronauts Roger Chaffee, Virgil “Gus” Grissom, and Ed White,
caught fire during a rehearsal of its scheduled Feb. 21 launch
(Fig. 1). By the time the ground crew was able to open the
hatch, the three astronauts had perished. On April 24, 1967,
NASA announced that the flight would be officially re-designated “Apollo 1.” In this case study, we conduct a basic horizontal flame test, patterned after the protocols set forth by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to measure the ignitability of solids. The laboratory activity is a complementary
exercise to the vertical flame test described in our previous
article that examined the initial source of fuel for the fire that
destroyed the massive German zeppelin Hindenburg in 1937.1
Combining techniques from both case studies gives students
a quantitative understanding of how the flammability of materials is tested and how a forensics approach to physics can be
used to understand significant historical events.

Fig. 1. The primary crew of Apollo 1. Left to right:
Edward H. White II (Lt. Col., USAF – Senior Pilot),
Virgil I. “Gus” Grissom (Lt. Col., USAF – Command
Pilot), and Roger B. Chaffee (Lt. Cdr., USN – Pilot).
(Photo courtesy of NASA)

Commanding the first manned Apollo mission was
40-year-old veteran astronaut, Virgil I. Grissom, Lieutenant
Colonel, USAF. A native of Mitchell, IN, and 1950 graduate of
Purdue University’s mechanical engineering program, Grissom was one of NASA’s original class of astronauts—the famed
“Mercury 7 Astronauts.” Preferring to be called “Gus,” Grissom
previously commanded the second suborbital Mercury flight
as well as the first manned Gemini mission. As the command
pilot aboard Apollo 1, Grissom was seated in the left-most
seat (facing the cockpit dash) and had access to the emergency cabin pressure relief valve, to be opened in the event of a
cabin fire. The senior pilot aboard Apollo 1 was another space
veteran, 36-year-old Edward H. White II, Lieutenant Colonel,

USAF. Born in San Antonio, TX, White graduated from West
Point and flew aboard Gemini 4, becoming the first American
astronaut to perform a spacewalk on June 3, 1965. As senior
pilot aboard Apollo 1, White was seated in the center and was
responsible for opening the main hatch if the crew had to make
an emergency egress from the cockpit. Rounding out the crew
of Apollo 1 was 31-year-old Grand Rapids, MI, native and pilot
Roger B. Chaffee, Lieutenant Commander, USN. Like Grissom, Chaffee was a graduate of Purdue University, earning his
bachelor’s of aeronautical engineering in 1957. As one of the
youngest astronauts selected by NASA, Chaffee was to take his
first flight into space on Apollo 1. During the flight rehearsal,
he was seated in the right-most seat and charged with maintaining communications with ground controllers in the event
of an emergency. Additional biographical information on the
astronauts can be found in our supplemental material (see the
online appendix for details).2, 3

“Go fever!”
To meet President Kennedy’s challenge of landing a man
on the Moon before 1970, NASA had to develop an unprecedented amount of flight hardware, training protocols, and
mission procedures in just a few short years. In this highstakes, high-risk atmosphere, the U.S. space industry developed what is commonly referred to today as “go fever”—a
group-think phenomenon in which people push themselves,
despite great danger, to meet a previously chosen goal. Unfortunately, “go fever” was causing concern for the primary and
backup crews of Apollo 1. For example, during a spacecraft
review meeting held on August 19, 1966, the astronauts expressed worry about having so much flammable VELCRO®
inside the cabin.4 Despite these concerns, engineers kept the
flammable material in the capsule to facilitate the securing of
tools and equipment. Engineers marched forward with their
planned Feb. 21 launch.
Cape Kennedy Air Force Station Launch Complex 34A
was the site for the “Plugs Out Integrated Test” of the AS-204
spacecraft on Jan. 27, 1967. The “plugs out” moniker describes
a test of the vehicle to see how it performs under internal
power, with no umbilicals supplying off-board power to the
ship. The rehearsal was dubbed “non-hazardous” since no
pyrotechnic systems were armed nor was the rocket fueled. At
1:00 p.m., the crew climbed into the capsule and was strapped
into their seats. Grissom immediately reported a foul odor of
“sour buttermilk” circulating through his suit. The simulated
countdown was suspended at 1:20 p.m. and resumed at 2:42
p.m. when engineers could not identify a cause of the odor.
At this point, the complicated three-layered hatch was closed.
The air in the cockpit was then replaced by pure oxygen, pressurized to 16.7 psi, to drive out any air that entered the cockpit

as the crew boarded as well as to seal the plug door. Such a
door seals itself by taking advantage of a pressure difference
established across its two sides. As the cabin is pressurized, a
wedge-shaped door is forced into a socket, forming a seal that
prevents it from being opened until the cabin pressure can be
released. Most commercial aircraft in service today use a plug
door design. The decision to use a pure oxygen environment,
over a duel-gas nitrogen-oxygen system, makes sense for several reasons: it is simpler to design, weighs less, and eliminates
the possibility of decompression sickness (i.e., “the bends”).
Once the capsule was in space during an actual flight, the
pure oxygen atmosphere would have been lowered to 5 psi to
reduce the risk of fire while still sealing the hatch against the
almost zero pressure of space.

“We’ve got a fire in the cockpit”
Problems plagued Apollo 1 all afternoon, most of them
involving the communications system. The countdown was
suspended again at 5:40 p.m. while engineers tried to debug
the problems. At 6:30 p.m., the countdown remained on hold.
Grissom’s microphone was stuck on (recording the audio
used to determine what happened) and controllers heard him
question: “How are we going to get to the Moon if we can’t talk
between two or three buildings?” In the midst of all of this “go
fever,” something was about to “go” terribly wrong.
The Apollo 204 Review Board’s reconstruction of events
estimates the fire to have progressed as follows: At exactly
6:30:55 p.m., engineers detected a power surge that accompanied an electrical short, probably sparked by a chafed wire,
somewhere in the lower left side of the CM near the environmental control unit below Grissom’s seat. The Apollo 1 fire
now had its ignition source. The initial source of fuel for the
fire was the polyethylene tubing that covered the wires running throughout the capsule. Several large patches of adhesive
VELCRO hooks that were attached to the wall panels of the
CM, leg-rests, and seats were the next materials to ignite.
Eventually, the fire reached the astronauts. At 6:31:04 p.m.,
a crew member (an audio analysis is inconclusive as to the
identity) shouted: “Hey!” or “Fire!” At 6:31:06 p.m., Chaffee
reported: “We’ve got a fire in the cockpit.” White struggled
to open the main hatch while Grissom, blocked by a wall of
flames, tried to reach the emergency cabin pressure vent valve.
To prevent the hatch from accidentally opening upon splashdown, the hatch had been redesigned with no explosive bolts
to blow it open. As the fire burned, pressure inside the cabin
increased, sealing the plug door tighter and tighter. At 6:31:13
p.m., a badly garbled voice (believed to be White’s) shouted:
“We’ve got a bad fire. … Let’s get out … .We’re burning up,”
followed by a prolonged scream of pain.5 At 6:31:19 p.m., the
interior pressure reached 29 psi and burst the inner wall of the
CM, allowing ambient air into the cabin. All transmissions
of voice and data from the spacecraft terminated by 6:31:22,
three seconds after the CM’s inner wall burst. A secondary fire
broke out as flammable materials inside the cabin (i.e., polyethylene tubing, VELCRO netting, nylon suits, etc.) burned
(Fig. 2).

Fig. 2. The badly charred interior of the AS-204
Command Module in the aftermath of the fire. (Photo
courtesy of NASA).3

By roughly 6:36 p.m., ground controllers opened the hatch
—only five minutes had elapsed since the first report of a
fire. Smoke and lethal gases from the fire had asphyxiated the
astronauts. The nylon outer covering of the astronauts’ space
suits and life-support hoses were melted and their bodies were
fused to the interior of the cockpit. Seven and a half hours
after the fire, the bodies were removed. Autopsies confirmed
that all three crewmen died from carbon monoxide poisoning, resulting in cerebral hypoxia and cardiac arrest. Burns
suffered by the crew were not believed to have contributed
to their deaths as they occurred postmortem. Details of the
fire are provided in our supplemental material (see the online
appendix for details).2,3 Finally, a number of multimedia resources are available to portray events to students in the classroom. For example, the episode “Apollo 1,” from the 12-part
1998 HBO docudrama miniseries “From the Earth to the
Moon,” does a fantastic job dramatizing the Apollo 1 tragedy
and the ensuing Congressional investigation. There is another
scene, “This is what we did instead of sleep,” that exemplifies
the fast-paced “go fever” mindset that plagued the mission.6,7

Apollo 1 in the physics laboratory
In our prior work, we investigated how fabrics burn vertically after the source of ignition is removed. The activity was
modeled after ASTM D 6413-99—The Standard Test Method
for Flame Resistance of Textiles (Vertical Test), which has
been adopted as an accepted Federal Test Standard.1,8 We now
add a horizontal flame test to our repertoire of laboratory
activities. This test is modeled after EPA Method 1030—Ignitability of Solids.9Although the method is used primarily
to test pastes, granular materials, and powdery substances, it
works on any solid material that can be cut into strips. Since
the procedures for the vertical flame test were already described in our previous publication, we now describe only the
procedures for the horizontal flame test yet report results for
both orientations.1 Also, since English units are used in the
ASTM protocols, we also use English units in our analysis.
The equipment and materials needed to run this activity cost
under $30 and were readily obtained from local hardware and

fabric stores. We piloted our activity on a cohort of undergraduate students.
• Sample preparation: We purchased a ceramic plate
(24 in36 in35/16 in) at a local hardware store. Using a permanent marker, we drew two lines, 4.0 in apart, centered
on the plate. The burn rate of samples would be measured
between these two lines. Several combustible materials were
factors in the Apollo 1 fire; however, polyethylene tubing
and VELCRO (both hook and loop sides) were the primary
culprits and thus formed the basis of our laboratory exercise.
We made no attempt to purchase fabrics or tubing with the
exact specifications of those aboard Apollo 1. Instead, we
chose to test the readily available modern-day versions of
these materials. We are aware that the materials manufactured
today are different from those aboard Apollo 1, especially
since flame-retardant technologies have dramatically evolved
over the last 50 years. With this in mind, we next purchased
polyethylene wire covering that we rolled flat and swatches
of VELCRO hooks and loops that we ironed flat. These three
materials were then distributed to students who trimmed
them into five 12-in-3-3-in strips and weighed each strip
(the weight of each sample is only needed for the vertical burn
test). Each strip was placed into a frame of sheet metal that
secured the strip on its two long sides, leaving its two short
edges exposed. The strips were clamped to the frame at four
locations with simple binder clips. Using this sample preparation technique allows students to test samples in either the
horizontal or vertical orientations.
• Testing and results: We placed the ceramic plate on the
floor of a safety hood. We then set the metal frame 1 in over
the center of the plate by balancing the corners of the frame
on stacks of 2-in-3-2-in ceramic tiles [Fig. 3(a)]. We oriented the long axis of the frame perpendicular to the airflow
of the safety hood, which was held at 0.7 to 1 m/s, and took
precautions to minimize drafts in the hood. To enhance the
filming of flames, we dimmed the lights and placed a black
poster inside the hood to serve as a background. We made
no attempt to control ambient temperature nor to create an
oxygen-rich pressured atmosphere. Each of the three samples
was tested five times and the average was reported per sample.
In agreement with the literature, our burn rates were repeatable to within 10%.9 A Bunsen burner, with 10-mm inside
diameter barrel, was used to create a 1.5-in high, 99%-pure
methane flame. The burner could be swiveled so that the tip of
the flame was brought to the exposed edge of the sample. The
flame was applied for 12 ± 0.5 s (flame to strip), as measured
by a stopwatch. Note that EPA Method 1030 (horizontal flame
test) recommends that the flame be applied for 2 min, while
ASTM D 6413-99 (vertical flame test) recommends that the
flame be applied for only 12 s. In order to present students
with a uniform testing procedure, we adopted the 12-s application for both types of test. Also, beware that many synthetic
materials are prone to “sputtering”—a phenomenon whereby
burning particles of fabric are sporadically ejected several
inches from the propagating flame front. Although fascinating

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Fig. 3. Our apparatus for horizontal flame testing. (a) Start of
test. (b) A flame front crosses the beginning of the 4-in testing zone. (c) A flame front propagates across the 4-in testing
zone. (d) A flame front crosses the end of the 4-in testing zone.

to observe, sputtering can be especially problematic during the
vertical flame test, so be sure that the students completely close
the window to the safety hood once they remove the flame
from the sample. Students filmed each trial using cell phone
cameras in slow-motion mode. Once the flame was removed,
students continued to film the strip until any visual flame or
glow self-extinguished [Fig. 3(b), (c), and (d)]. These videos
are used to determine the duration of time, to 0.1-s resolution, that the samples needed to burn across the 4-in distance
marked by the permanent lines on the ceramic plate. Any signs
of melting, dripping, or sputtering were noted.
As students conduct their trials, the propagation of flames,
accompanied by the sputtering, dripping, and melting of
fabrics and tubing, is striking to see. Even in the absence of
a pressurized oxygen environment, students dramatically
observe the highly dangerous conditions that must have consumed the interior of the Apollo 1 cockpit! Table I shows data
from a typical run of our activity. Data from the horizontal
flame tests indicate that without the pressurized oxygen environment, a fire consuming pure polyethylene or VELCRO as
its fuel would need 40 to 90 min to travel a distance equal to
the diameter of the CM. In the case of the vertical flame tests,
such a fire would need 15 to 25 min to propagate a distance
equal to the height of the CM. Thus, regardless of orientation,
the samples do not burn at fast enough rates to consume a
ship the size of an Apollo CM in the timeframe observed
during the Apollo 1 fire (i.e., half a minute). Students in our
cohort quickly realized that the atmospheric burn rates of
these materials are much slower than those observed inside
the capsule, demonstrating that the pressurized pure oxygen
environment dramatically changed the flammability of the interior fabrics and was critical to the rapid spread of the fire inside the capsule. In fact, literature indicates that polyethylene
and VELCRO burn over twice as fast in oxygen at a pressure
of 16.5 psi than at 5 psi. Therefore, before the inner wall of
the CM ruptured, the primary fuels for the fire burned more
than twice as fast as they did under the conditions for which
they were evaluated.10 Even more incredibly, transcripts from

Conclusions
A compelling case can be made for bringing the anniversary of the Apollo 1 fire into the introductory physics classroom.
First, the physics of flammability can be treated appropriately
at the introductory level since only careful measurements of
time, distance, and weight are needed. Second, the case study
is interdisciplinary. While we piloted this case study in a science education class, it may also be useful in introductory
engineering classes, senior engineering ethics classes, and
fiber science classes. The fire can even serve as the basis of a
senior-level capstone project. Next, the resulting analysis provides instructors with several “teachable moments”—it brings
real-world applications of physics to the classroom; it shows
how standardized testing protocols are used; and it demonstrates to students (perhaps for the first time) the field of failure analysis and how a cascade of unlikely events can result in
an unpredictable catastrophe. Indeed, far from being a set of
agreed upon immutable facts, the historical record is a living,
changing thing and is open to revisitation, reexamination,
and reinterpretation. However, an interview conducted by
Gus Grissom a few weeks before his death provides perhaps
the best reason for sharing this case study with our students.
During the interview, Grissom was asked about the dangers
of spaceflight. He replied: “If we die, we want people to accept it. We’re in a risky business, and we hope that if anything
happens to us it will not delay the program. The conquest of
space is worth the risk of life.”13 Thus, bringing the Apollo 1
fire to the introductory physics classroom uniquely raises the
historical awareness of our students by vividly portraying the
heroic efforts of those individuals involved in the early days of
the exploration of space.
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